One of the main obstacles to Sinn Fein`s inclusion in the peace process has been the nature of its links with the IRA, the paramilitary organisation responsible for most of the attacks on British and Ulster security forces and loyalist paramilitaries, as well as a series of high-profile attacks in England, including an aborted attack on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher , who killed one of his accomplices. The exact nature of the relationship between the two groups has been (and will remain) highly controversial, both ahead of the agreement and ahead of its implementation. Sinn Fein leaders have always insisted that they are separated and that Sinn Fein cannot speak for the IRA.31 To some extent, this was a kind of denial that the IRA had to give the flexibility to explore what Sinn Fein could use as an “extract” to explore the possible outcomes of the negotiations without effectively forcing the IRA to accept the political path.32 In the same time , there is good reason to believe that Sinn Fein`s leadership did not have sufficient influence within the IRA in the decisive moments to achieve the IRA`s preferred results, particularly on the issue of the IRA dismantling its weapons.33 to exclude the verdict that it was a familiar round of negotiation intended to convince the other parties (unionists). Dublin, London and Washington), that Sinn Fein had reached the end of its flexibility. Reg Empey, a leading Ulster Unionist Party negotiator and seconded unionist, called the argument that Sinn Fein and the IRA are clearly a “charade.” 34 Sinn Fein was also influenced by its assessment of the future. On the one hand, their leaders thought they had learned most of what they could learn from the use of force. They also feared that they would not be able to maintain the IRA ceasefire much longer if they did not reach negotiations. But they also understood that by making significant concessions (for example. B abandoning their insistence that Britain renounce sovereignty over Northern Ireland and accept the principle of approval), they could turn the time in their favour by securing a union agreed by the ballot box. Thus, the unionists` fears about the future and the hopes of the Republicans over them led both sides to conclude that this agreement, with all its painful compromises, was better than to go away and seize a chance for the future. Perhaps the best way to characterize the Agency`s role is to say that the circumstance gave each of the major players a reasonably favourable hand that allowed an agreement, but that everyone played the hand quite skilfully.99 Everyone saw earlier than many others the way to the agreement. You can imagine that others who might have been plausible in their place – even those who shared the same fundamental approach to conflict – may not have sealed the agreement when it was concluded. At the same time, the fact that the agreement was finally implemented by a pact that presented Paisley as prime minister reflects the power of forces that insist on ending the fighting.
The Agency has played an important role in the time and precise conditions of the agreement, but is probably much less important in the broader abandonment of violence. Three new institutions were added to the agreement: the agreement consists of two related documents, both agreed on Good Friday, 10 April 1998 in Belfast: the PARTICIPATION of the United States after the issuance of the visa was followed by two ways. First, efforts were made to promote economic development and investment in Northern Ireland to show the benefits that peace could bring to both communities.59 More direct diplomacy ensued with the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell, who was to lead the negotiations, and Clinton`s personal commitment.